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An Analysis of Gains and Losses to Shareholders of Foreign Bidding 
Companies Engaged in Cross-Border Acquisitions Into the United Kingdom 
- 1986-1991 
 
 
 ABSTRACT 
 
 
In this paper, the gains and losses to shareholders of 71 foreign companies which made 
takeover bids for companies listed in the United Kingdom during the 1986-1991 period are 
analysed. 
The average abnormal return during the month of the bid announcement was positive, 
although not statistically significant.  However, both prior to and subsequent to the bid 
announcement month, the overseas bidders earned highly significant negative abnormal returns. 
 The cumulative abnormal returns over the five month period following the bid announcement 
were - 4.77% with the index model and - 9.79% with the market model. 
Further analysis established that Continental European companies performed 
significantly worse than American bidders.  In addition, large companies and companies bidding 
for large targets, performed significantly better than the other bidders. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
The level of takeover activity in the United Kingdom grew rapidly during the late 1980s.  
The total value of acquisitions of companies in the UK rose from approximately £2.5 billion in 
1983 to a peak of just under £38 billion in 1989.  As can be seen from figure 1, to a large extent 
this takeover boom was fuelled by cross-border acquisitions into the UK.  Indeed, in 1990, 
takeovers by foreign entities accounted for 58% of the total value of acquisitions in the UK.  It is 
probable that this increase in cross-border takeover activity was, at least partially, a result of the 
passing of the Single European Act in 1985. 
================ 
Insert Figure 1 here 
================ 
While a substantial amount of research has analysed the wealth effect of domestic 
mergers and acquisitions, the existing literature on cross-border acquisitions is rather more 
limited.  In addition, as discussed further in section 2, the current literature tends to be heavily 
skewed towards the US market.  The gains or losses to the shareholders of overseas companies 
from cross-border acquisitions into the UK has largely been left unexplored.  The purpose of this 
study is to fill this gap. 
The focus of this paper is on the gains and losses to shareholders of the foreign 
companies which made takeover bids for listed UK companies during the period from 1986 to 
1991.  The analysis includes an evaluation of the performance of the cross-border bidding 
companies prior to and after the bid announcement, as well as during the bid period.  In addition 
to analysing the overall takeover effect, the analysis also attempts to establish whether the 
abnormal returns are dependent on the nationality of the overseas bidding companies.  Cross-
sectional analysis is also applied to evaluate the significance of certain characteristics on the 
wealth effects to the shareholders of the bidding companies.  The variables included are: (a) 
whether the bid succeeds or fails, (b) whether or not the offer is competitive or (c) revised, (d) 
the method of payment, (e) the relative size of the bidding and target companies, and (f) the 
absolute size of the bidder. 
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This paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 looks at the theoretical considerations and 
contains a short overview of the existing literature.  The data sources and the methodologies 
applied in this paper are explained in section 3.  The results are discussed in section 4, while a 
brief summary and the conclusions are given in section 5. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Several studies have analysed the wealth effects to bidding companies of engaging in 
domestic acquisitions.  Focusing on takeovers in the UK, Firth (1979) found that the acquiring 
companies experienced an abnormal loss of 6% during the two month period surrounding the bid 
announcement.  In value terms, these losses offset any gains made by the target companies' 
shareholders.  However, a study by Franks and Harris (1989) contradict Firth's findings.  Franks 
and Harris analysed 1,800 UK takeovers during the 1955 to 1985 period.  They found that 
bidding company shareholders gained modestly, or at least did not lose from the bid 
announcement. 
Limmack (1991) analysed takeover bids in the UK announced between 1977 and 1986.  
Limmack applied three different test modelsi, and for all three models found that bidding 
companies on average experienced positive abnormal returns in the month prior to the bid 
announcement.  However, while Limmack found bidders to perform well prior to the acquisitions, 
they tended to lose from the acquisitions.  During the period from the bid announcement through 
to the outcome day, bidders lost, regardless of bid outcome (although the loss was larger in 
unsuccessful bids).  During the 24 months following the announcement of bid outcome, bidders 
in both completed and abandoned offers experienced "...a downward drift in returns over the 
whole period". (p. 248). 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) summarised the results of 13 US studies.  For the bidding 
companies they found a positive announcement effect in successful offers, although most of this 
gain was lost over the year following the takeover.  Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) found no 
abnormal returns to bidders in 399 US acquisitions. 
 
As was highlighted by Fatemi and Furtado (1988), cross-border acquisitions may have 
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very different characteristics from domestic acquisitions: 
 
"Transnational acquisitions would not be any different from domestic acquisitions, and 
therefore would not have any differential wealth effects, if 
 
(1) the market for corporate control were not segmented across national boundaries, 
(2) the capital markets were not internationally segmented, and 
(3) there were no net benefits (disadvantages) associated with international 
diversification. 
 
However, differential wealth effects may exist if any of these conditions do not hold."  (p. 
364). 
 
Combining this with the very substantial value of cross-border acquisitions into the UK, it is 
rather surprising that there appears to be only two previous studies which have analysed the 
wealth effects of cross-border acquisitions into this market.  Conn and Connell (1990) analysed 
the share price performance of both bidding and target companies in mergers between 
companies based in the United States and the United Kingdom which took place between 1971 
and 1980.  With regard to their sample of 35 American companies acquiring in the UK, Conn and 
Connell found that these corporations performed very well prior to the announcement of the 
cross-border bids, but over the six months following the bid announcement, the share prices 
experienced on average an abnormal loss of 2.5%ii.  Conn and Connell concluded that: 
"Controlling for methods used, international mergers by US firms are viewed more 
sceptically by the securities market than are domestic US mergers at the time of first 
public announcement." (p. 702). 
 
A similar study was carried out by Feils (1993), who in her unpublished Ph.D. thesis 
analysed target and bidding companies in cross-border acquisitions between the UK and the US, 
as well as German acquisitions of US firms during the time period 1980 to 1990.  Using the 
market model for a short event window (t-5 to t+5 days, where t=0 is the day of the bid 
announcement), she concluded that "...U.S. and German acquiring firms lose insignificantly, 
while British acquiring firms lose significantly in international acquisitions". (p. v). 
While the papers by Conn and Connell and Feils cast some interesting light on cross-
border acquisitions into the UK, their studies are rather restrictive in that they did not include an 
analysis of takeovers into the UK by companies based outside the US.  However, as detailed 
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below, most other studies of cross-border acquisitions have tended to be even more restrictive 
with regard to which, if any, foreign companies to include in the analysis. 
Any study based on share price information for overseas companies soon runs into the 
problem of data limitations.  The majority of researchers of cross-border acquisitions have 
avoided the issue by excluding the foreign companies from the analysis, and have simply 
restricted the analysis to the companies based in a country such as the United States where 
data is comparatively easy to obtain.  For example, Wansley, Lane and Yang (1983), Shaked, 
Michel and McClain (1991), Harris and Ravenscraft (1991), Swenson (1993) and Dewenter 
(1995), all compared the share price performance of US target companies in cross-border and 
domestic acquisitions.  The foreign bidding companies were not included in their analyses. 
Similarly, Fatemi and Furtado (1988), Doukas and Travlos (1988), Sudia (1992), 
Markides and Ittner (1994), and Manzon, Sharp and Travlos (1994), analysed cross-border 
acquisitions, focusing on the American acquiring companies.  Again the foreign companies were 
ignored.  With regard to the American cross-border bidders, Fatemi and Furtado (1988) found 
weak evidence supporting the view that "...foreign acquisitions are associated with positive 
abnormal returns when they are the means of an initial entry into a foreign market.  No 
significant wealth effects are present otherwise". (p. 363). 
In their analysis of 301 cross-border acquisitions, Doukas and Travlos (1988) reached 
similar conclusions.  On the day of the bid announcement, the bidding companies on average 
experienced a small, statistically insignificant, positive abnormal return (0.08%).  However, this 
average masked the fact that "Shareholders of U.S. firms expanding internationally for the first 
time experience insignificant positive abnormal returns, while shareholders of MNCs 
[multinational corporations] operating already in the target firm's country experience insignificant 
negative abnormal returns". (p. 1161). 
In their study, Markides and Ittner (1994) concluded: "The two-day abnormal return for 
our study of 276 U.S. international acquisitions between 1975 and 1988 was .32%, statistically 
significant at the 10% level". (p. 354).  Sudia (1992) analysed the effect on US bidders of 
regulatory changes governing cross-border acquisitions, while Manzon, Sharp and Travlos 
(1994) looked at the consequences of changing US tax rules for US cross-border bidders. 
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Tessema (1985) analysed abnormal returns to US bidding and US target companies in 
cross-border and domestic acquisitions during the period 1974 to 1983.  For the bidders he 
found that "...stockholders of acquiring firms at least do not lose". (p. iii).  For the total analysis 
period, Tessema found no differences in abnormal returns in domestic US and cross-border 
acquisitions. 
A few studies have included an analysis of the foreign target and/or bidding companies in 
cross-border acquisitions.  Mathur, Chhachhi and Sundaram (1989) analysed a small sample of 
18 cross-border mergers into the US.  They found that the overseas bidders lost a statistically 
insignificant 3% during the 31 day period surrounding the bid announcement.  In their analysis of 
cross-border bidders into the United States, Servaes and Zenner (1990) studied the 70 overseas 
bidding companies which had their shares or American Depositary Receipts traded in the United 
States.  They found that these companies had an insignificant negative abnormal return of -
0.15% during a two day event window. 
Mathur, Rangan, Chhachhi and Sundaram (1994) analysed the abnormal returns from 
cross-border acquisitions into the US by 77 overseas bidding companies from 10 countries.  
They concluded: "The results show that stockholders of foreign bidders earn significant, negative 
abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of an acquisition in the USA.  These abnormal 
returns become increasingly negative over the 15 days after the announcement of the 
acquisition, indicating that more information about the acquisition is revealed to investors 
subsequent to the initial announcement". (p. 107). 
Both Kang (1993) and Pettway, Sicherman and Spiess (1993) analysed abnormal returns 
to US targets and Japanese bidders from cross-border acquisitions into the US.  Both studies 
found significant positive abnormal returns to the Japanese acquiring companies.  Song (1993) 
analysed the gains and losses to US targets and overseas bidding companies from 118 cross-
border acquisitions into the US.  He found that the overseas bidders lost marginally (-0.42%) 
over a 21 day period from t-10 to t+10 days.  However, Song found that larger bidders on 
average did better than smaller bidders.  Thus, "Although abnormal returns are negative, 
acquisition announcements, on average increase acquirers' stock values by $30.3 million". (p. 
126). 
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In her unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Biswas (1990) studied cross-border acquisitions 
between financial companies.  Her study was truly international, with an analysis of both target 
and bidding companies from all over the worldiii.  The average abnormal return over a 11-day 
period surrounding the bid announcement (t-5, t+5 days) was 0.003%.  Her results are, however, 
difficult to interpret, as they do not identify returns to bidders or targets from acquisitions into 
specific countries, but rather combines takeovers into a total of 11 countries. 
While the studies by Conn and Connell (1990) and Feils (1993) established that US 
companies generally under-performed at the announcement of, and subsequent to, an 
acquisition in the UK, there is a general lack of knowledge as to what impact cross-border 
acquisitions into the UK have on the share price of the overseas bidding companies.  The Conn 
and Connell paper covered the period from 1971 to 1980.  The study by Feils thus appears to be 
the only previous work looking at takeovers into the UK during the cross-border takeover boom 
of the late 1980s.  It should also be borne in mind that her study analysed abnormal returns over 
a short time frame (11 days).  As is discussed further below, such an event window may not be 
sufficient to capture the full wealth effect of the cross-border acquisitions.  An additional 
limitation of the existing literature, is that there appears to be no relevant published material on 
cross-border acquisitions into the UK by companies based outside the US.  This study aims to fill 
this gap. 
The existing takeover literature has identified a number of variables which may have an 
impact on the abnormal returns to bidding companies: 
 
* As was mentioned above, Limmack (1991) found that bidding companies performed 
significantly worse in failed takeovers than in successful ones.  Similar observations have 
been made in other studies, such as Asquith (1983). 
* Bradley, Desai & Kim (1988) found that competitive bids had a negative impact on the 
bidding companies abnormal returns.  However, Franks, Harris and Titman (1989) 
argued that "...bidders pay more for targets that are contested (multiple bidders) ... but 
that bidders do not experience significant negative announcement returns as a 
consequence". (p. 92). 
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* It may also be hypothesised that the bidding company will perform worse when it is 
forced to revise the initial offer (e.g., due to opposition from target company management 
or due to the offer being competitive).   
* Several studies (e.g., Franks and Harris (1989)) have found that the bidding company 
performs significantly better in cash than in equity financed takeovers.  However, Franks, 
Harris and Titman (1991) found that "Although the difference between the performance 
of all-cash and all-equity bidders is large, it is ... not statistically significant". (p. 92).  
Similar results were obtained by Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992). 
* The acquisition of a large target is likely to have a greater impact on the fortunes of the 
acquiring company than a small acquisition.  Indeed, previous research such as Asquith, 
Bruner and Mullins (1983), have found a positive relationship between bidding company 
cumulative abnormal returns and the size of the target relative to the size of the bidder.  
Similarly, Markides and Ittner (1994) found the relative size (as measured by value of 
sales rather than market values) of the bidder and target to be highly significant.  
However, Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) found "...no significant link between relative 
size and either target or bidder gains". (p. 93). 
* It may be hypothesised that larger companies will have more experience in undertaking 
acquisitions or operating abroad than smaller companies.  In addition, larger companies 
are likely to have more resources available to be able to fully analyse and plan the cross-
border acquisition.  Indeed, Song (1993) found that large bidders on average performed 
better than smaller bidders.  However, in their study of US takeovers, Franks, Harris and 
Titman (1991) found "...smaller firms clearly outperforming larger firms...". (p. 90). 
 
This study will analyse the impact of these bid characteristics on the level of abnormal returns to 
overseas companies engaged in making cross-border bids for UK listed companies. 
 
3. DATA SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 
This paper analyses cross-border takeover bids for UK listed companies that were made 
on or after January 1st 1986 and for which the outcome (successful or failed) was known prior to 
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the end of December 1991.  Information as to what takeover bids took place, the name of the 
bidding and target companies, the bid outcome, whether or not the bid was competitive, and the 
method of payment, was obtained from Acquisitions Monthly.  The nationality of the bidding 
companies was also generally available from Acquisitions Monthly.  When a takeover has been 
carried out through a subsidiary, the ultimate parent company has been analysed rather than the 
subsidiary.  For the majority of the foreign bidding companies the classification of nationality 
used by Acquisitions Monthly (which classifies the bidding companies according to where they 
have their registered office) has been adopted in this paper.  However, for a few of the bidding 
companies, a stock market listing was only available in a market other than that specified by 
Acquisitions Monthly as the home country of the company.  In these circumstances, the share 
price performance of the bidding company has been compared to the performance of the stock 
market index in the market in which the company is listed.  Similarly, the nationality of the 
company has been re-classified to be the country in which the shares are listed. 
The market capitalisation for the bidding companies was obtained from Datastream.  The 
market value was measured 9 months prior to the date of the bid announcement, and converted 
into Sterling at the exchange rate operating at that time.  The market values for the target 
companies were obtained from the London Business School Risk Measurement Service 
(Dimson & March)iv.  
Both Fatemi and Furtado (1988) and Doukas and Travlos (1988) argued that bidding 
companies perform better when entering into new markets.  A similar analysis has not been 
performed in this study, due to lack of data on the bidding companies previous experience 
abroadv. 
During the 6 year period of analysis, a total of 966 takeover bids were made for UK 
companies listed either on the Stock Exchange or in the OTC market; 756 (78.3%) by other UK 
companies or individuals, 208 (21.5%) by foreign entities, and finally 2 bids (0.2%) involved 
foreign and domestic companies bidding together. 
The focus of this study is on the 208 cross-border takeover bids.  This paper thus 
provides a census of the cross-border takeover bids into the UK during the 1986-1991 period, as 
far as data allowed.  However, not all these takeover bids were suitable for inclusion in the 
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analysisvi, and a total of 34 bids had to be rejected.  Consequently, the total number of takeover 
bids for which analysis was attempted was 174vii. 
This study has relied on Datastream International for the overseas share price data.  
While Datastream adjusts share prices for capitalisation changes, it does not make adjustments 
for dividend payments.  Share prices therefore had to be separately adjusted for dividend 
payments in order to obtain return data.  While Datastream's coverage of share price information 
is generally very good, it is surprisingly patchy with regard to dividend payments.  To overcome 
this problem, it was necessary to obtain a large part of the dividend data from various Stock 
Exchanges and foreign companies directly. 
When trying to establish whether shareholders gain or lose from a takeover, it is not 
sufficient simply to look at changes in share prices (or return data) directly.  As share prices 
change for a number of reasons unrelated to bid announcements, the return data ought to be 
analysed in a way which excludes the effect of changes in the level of the stock market as a 
whole.   There are several models which are commonly used for this purpose.  In an analysis of 
domestic UK acquisitions, Limmack (1991) applied three different test models, and concluded 
that "The results provide conflicting evidence depending on the period included in the analysis of 
abnormal returns and the control model used". (p. 250).  Similarly, Franks and Harris (1989) also 
obtained different abnormal returns, particularly in the post-bid period, depending on which of 
their three models was being applied.  In this study, two of the more common models have been 
applied: the market model (MM), and the index model (IM).  These models are specified as 
follows: 
 
MM:  logeRi = αi + βilogeRm + µi (1) 
IM:  logeRi = logeRm + µi (2) 
 
where loge is the natural log, Ri is the return on the share, Rm the return on the marketviii, αi and βi 
regression coefficients, and µi the error term (the abnormal return during the analysis period).  
The MM parameters for each bidder have been estimated using OLS regressions on monthly 
data for a 60 month period ending 9 months prior to the month of the bid announcementix. 
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If the stock market is efficient, share prices should react quickly to the release of new 
information (see Fama (1991)).  However, with regard to takeovers, previous studies have 
indicated that information appears to leak to the market prior to the official bid announcementx.  
As argued by Magenheim and Mueller (1988), analysis of takeover effects would be relatively 
easy "...if all of the relevant information regarding an acquisition were to become public on the 
day the acquisition is announced and the market could be assumed to adjust fully in that day to 
the new information.  But news of an acquisition is known to leak into the market prior to the first 
public announcement, and it is unrealistic to assume that the market is capable of predicting the 
full future consequences of an acquisition immediately upon learning of it". (p. 172).  In addition, 
in order to establish whether the post bid share price performance differ between e.g., 
successful and failed bidders (as found by e.g., Limmack (1991)), it is necessary to include a 
period subsequent to the bid announcement in the analysis.  Consequently, in this study, the 
abnormal returns are calculated over a relatively long time period, extending from eight months 
prior to the month of the bid announcement (t-8), to five months after the month of the bid 
announcement (t+5).  However, this period has been split into three separate sub-periods: the 
pre-bid period (t-8, t-2), the bid period (t-1, t=0), and the post-bid period (t+1, t+5). 
While Datastream is possibly one of the best data sources available for overseas share 
price information, there is still a problem of data availability.  Of the 174 overseas bidding 
companies, information for 63 (36.2%) was not available from Datastream.  This may be due to 
the companies either not being listed at any stock exchange (e.g., private companies) or, for 
some reason, not being included in the Datastream database. 
An additional problem encountered was insufficient data availability.  For 40 companies, 
while some information was available from Datastream, this was insufficient for any analysisxi.  
This left a total of 71 overseas bidding companies for which sufficient data was available to apply 
the IM.  As the MM requires more data, the sample size for this model was unfortunately further 
restricted, to 50.  A full breakdown of the population and sample sizes by nationality of the 
bidding company, is given in table 1. 
================ 
Insert Table 1 here 
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================ 
Because of data limitations, the nationalities of the bidding companies for which data was 
available for analysis do not fully represent the nationalities of the population of cross-border 
takeover bids as a whole.  While companies from Austria, Belgium, Bermudaxii, British Virgin 
Islands, Cayman Islands, Finland, Hong Kong, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Panama, 
South Africa and Saudi Arabia accounted for 28 (13.5%) of the 208 cross-border takeover bids 
for UK companies, insufficient data was available for any of these takeover bids to be analysed. 
There is a dominance of acquisitions by US companies, both in the population, and even 
more so in the analysis.  While US bidders accounted for 20.7% of all cross-border takeover bids 
during the period from 1986 to 1991, they account for 23.9% of the IM sample and 32% of the 
MM sample.  Despite this nationality-bias, companies from a total of 14 overseas countries are 
included in the analysis.  This study therefore gives a fuller picture of the gains or losses from 
cross-border acquisitions into the UK incurred by shareholders of the overseas bidding 
companies than did the studies by Conn and Connell (1990) and Feils (1993), who studied 
mergers between US and UK companies. 
There is also a possibility of a size-bias in the Datastream files.  However, as the market 
capitalisation of the non-listed companies is not known, it is impracticable to try to establish 
whether the market value of the companies included in the analysis is larger (or smaller) than the 
average market value for all the overseas bidding companies.  A size-bias is therefore virtually 
impossible to either prove or refute.  Of the 71 cross-border takeover bids that have been 
analysed, the average market value of the overseas bidding companies  
was £2,374.6 million.  There were, however, large variations in the size of the overseas bidding 
companies, with a few bidding companies with fairly low market values.  The distribution of 
market values of the overseas bidding companies is given in table 2. 
================ 
Insert Table 2 here 
================ 
As mentioned previously, several factors may have an impact on the abnormal return to 
the overseas bidding companies.  Cross-sectional analysis was undertaken in an attempt to 
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explain the cumulative abnormal returns.  The variables applied are defined as follows: 
 
Outcome: A dummy variable taking the value of 0 if the bid was successful (in that the 
bidding company obtained control over the target company) and 1 if the offer 
failed. 
Competitive: A dummy variable taking the value of 0 if there was a single bidder and the value 
1 if more than one company bid for the target (competitive bid). 
Revised: A dummy variable taking the value 0 if the offer was not revised and the value 1 if 
the terms of the offer were revised (price offered increased). 
Pay:  A dummy variable taking the value of 0 if there was not a full cash alternative and 
the value 1 if the offer included a full cash alternative. 
Rel Size: The pre-bid market value of the target divided by the pre-bid market value of the 
bidder. 
Size:  The natural log of the pre-bid market value of the bidding company. 
 
The analysis obtained are summarised and analysed in the following section. 
 
4. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
4.1. All Companies 
The signs of the cumulative abnormal returns are given in table 3.  As can be seen from 
this table, approximately 60% of the overseas bidding companies experienced an abnormal loss 
over the total analysis period.  Indeed, regardless of which model is being applied, approximately 
half (or more) of the companies had negative abnormal share returns over the period prior to the 
bid, during the bid period, and during the five month period following the bid announcement. 
================ 
Insert Table 3 here 
================ 
The results are similar once the size of the abnormal returns are taken into account.  The 
equally weighted abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns are given in table 4 and 
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depicted in figure 2. 
================ 
Insert Table 4 here 
================ 
================ 
Insert Figure 2 here 
================ 
 
Index Model versus Market Model 
As can be seen from table 4, the index model and the market model generally gives 
consistent results with regard to the direction of any abnormal return.  However, as was found by 
Franks and Harris (1989), the level of the abnormal returns is rather different for the two 
modelsxiii.  This is caused by the different assumptions underlying these models.  The index 
model assumes that all shares have the same characteristics as the market as a whole.  Thus α 
is assumed to be 0 and β to be 1 for all companies.  For the market model, the parameters are 
estimated, in this study over a 5 year period ending 9 month prior to the month of the bid 
announcement.  As is indicated in Table 5, the average market model α is above 0 and β below 
1.  These findings are similar to those of e.g., Franks and Harris (1989), Limmack (1991) and 
Connell and Conn (1993), although Connell and Conn obtained a β value for UK bidders above 
1. 
================ 
Insert Table 5 here 
================ 
The assumption of the market model is that the historical relationship between the return 
on the market and the return on the share is a good predictor for the future relationship.  One 
implication of this is that if the share outperformed the market during the parameter estimation 
period (as reflected in a positive α value), the share is expected to continue to outperform the 
market during the event period. 
In this study, the mean α was 0.00923.  One interpretation of this value, is that the 
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average bidding company is expected to have a rate of return of 0.9% per month (or 11.07% per 
year) in addition to the rate of return required to compensate for the share's level of systematic 
risk.  The large negative abnormal returns observed using the market model indicates that the 
overseas bidding companies were not able to fulfil this expectation over the period following the 
bid announcement.  Indeed, as indicated by the index model, the share prices of the overseas 
bidding companies performed worse than the stock market indices in their home markets around 
the period of the cross-border bids for UK listed companies. 
Connell and Conn (1993) found that the cumulative abnormal returns were highly 
sensitive to the period over which the market model parameters were estimated: "The sensitivity 
of CAR estimates to the different estimation periods appear to result from a significant decline in 
the intercept term, alpha, of the market model from a positive to a negative value from pre to 
post-event estimation" (p. 63).  It may be that companies decide to acquire other companies 
following a period of unusually good performance.  If the market model parameters are 
estimated during such an exceptional time period, it is possible that the α will be inflated.  This 
study tried to overcome this potential problem by estimating the market model parameters over a 
long time period, 60 months, ending 9 months prior to the bid announcement.  However, the 
large positive mean α may indicate that even this long time period was insufficient to overcome 
the problem of a positive mean α value being caused by exceptionally good pre-bid share 
performances of the overseas bidding companies. 
Another interpretation of the high α values (and low β values) observed in this study is 
that these results are caused by "thin" or nonynchronous trading.  If a share is infrequently 
traded, the market model may be misspecified.  "The major source of bias is the tendency for 
prices recorded at the end of a time period to represent the outcome of a transaction which 
occurred earlier in or prior to the period in question". (Dimson (1979), p. 179).  As was explained 
by Fowler, Rorke and Jog (1980), β will be downwardly biased if the share is less frequently 
traded than the index, and upwardly biased if the index is less frequently traded than the share. 
The low β values in this study could thus have been caused by the shares of the 
overseas bidding companies being less frequently traded than the stock market indices in the 
relevant markets.  It should be remembered, however, that infrequent trading may be 
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predominately a feature of small companies (see Roll (1981)).  While some of the bidding 
companies included in this study are small, the majority of bidders are fairly large companies.  
Thin trading is generally more of a concern in studies analysing target companies, as these are 
generally significantly smaller than the bidding companies.  In addition, nonsynchronous trading 
is also more likely to cause statistical difficulties in studies based on daily rather than monthly 
data (Brown and Warner (1985)). 
Various methods have been suggested for correcting the beta values for thin trading.  
Fowler, Rorke and Jog (1980) evaluated the effectiveness of four such techniquesxiv, and 
concluded: "In general, the OLS beta estimates seem to be better than those produced using 
any of the bias correcting techniques". (p. 89).  Fairly similar conclusions were reached by 
Brown and Warner (1985), who argued that "Methodologies based on procedures suggested by 
Scholes and Williams and of Dimson do seem to reduce biases in OLS estimates of β.  However, 
the specification and power of the actual tests for abnormal performance is similar to that 
obtained with the OLS market model, and this conclusion applies to samples having trading 
frequencies systematically different from average". (p. 26).  Consequently, no adjustments have 
been made to the market model β in this paper. 
As indicated above, the assumptions underlying the models cause the abnormal returns 
to differ between the market model and the index model.  In this study the results of both models 
will be reported for comparison purposesxv. 
 
Pre-bid period (t-8, t-2) 
As can be seen from table 4, the overseas bidding companies on average experienced a 
significantly positive abnormal return during the month t-6.  It is not yet known why such positive 
abnormal returns were observed.  However, over the following five months, the average 
abnormal returns were negative, and the cumulative abnormal returns over the pre-bid period 
were negative; -1.00% with the index model, and -5.63% with the market model.  The negative 
CAR was significant at the 10% level for the MM.  Thus, over the pre-bid period, the bidding 
companies marginally underperformed the market, but performed significantly worse than in 
previous periods. 
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Bid period (t-1, t=0) 
There were on average small abnormal gains during the month of the bid announcement. 
 These gains, of 0.80% for the index model and 0.23% for the market model, were not 
statistically significant.  However, abnormal losses were encountered during the month prior to 
the bid announcement, counterbalancing the gains observed in the bid month.  Indeed, for both 
test models, the bid announcement month was the only month between t-5 and t+5 for which the 
average abnormal returns were positive. 
Thus, looking simply at the short term abnormal returns, the small positive abnormal 
return in the bid announcement month observed in this study, is somewhat inconsistent with the 
results of Feils (1993), who established that US bidders lost marginally over an 11 day period 
surrounding the announcement of a takeover bid for a UK based company.  The findings in this 
study may, however, be consistent with those of Tessema (1985), Doukas and Travlos (1988), 
and Markides and Ittner (1994), who all applied short event windows to establish that US 
companies gained, or did at least not lose, from cross-border acquisitions.  It should be 
remembered, however, that the UK was only one of the target countries included in these 
studies.  With regard to studies analysing cross-border acquisitions into the United States, 
several papers have established (insignificant) short-term abnormal losses to the cross-border 
bidders (Mathur, Chhachhi, and Sundaram (1989), Servaes and Zenner (1990), and Song 
(1993)).  It should be remembered, however, that the positive t=0 abnormal returns observed in 
this study are not statistically significant and, as discussed further below, the bidding companies, 
on average, experienced significant negative abnormal returns over the period following the bid 
announcement. 
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Post-bid period (t+1, t+5) 
On average, the overseas bidding companies encountered a negative abnormal return in 
every month following the bid announcement.  The post-event cumulative abnormal returns were 
-4.77% with the index model (significant at 10%), and -9.79% with the market model (significant 
at the 1% level).  Thus, as was the case in the study by Conn and Connell (1990), overseas 
bidding companies, on average, experienced abnormal losses over the period following the bid 
announcement.  However, the level of the cumulative abnormal returns are much higher than 
those obtained by Conn and Connell.  It thus appears that cross-border bidders into the UK over 
the 1986 to 1991 period performed worse than did US companies acquiring in the UK over the 
1971-1980 period. 
In this study, the average abnormal returns were negative in every month following the 
bid announcement.  Similar negative post-announcement drifts were found by e.g., Asquith 
(1983), Franks, Harris and Mayer (1988), and Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992).  As outlined 
by Fama (1991), there is an ongoing debate with regard to what may explain this drift.  There are 
at least three possible explanations. 
Firstly, it may be the case that price sensitive information is released to the market after 
the official bid announcement.  For example, the eventual outcome of the bid will not be known 
until some time after the offer has been made.  As argued by Roll (1986), "At the original bid 
announcement ... there is only a probability of success.  Between the bid announcement and the 
final outcome this probability goes to 1.0 for the bids in the successful group.  Thus, if the 
combination itself has value for the bidder, these bidding firms should increase in value over this 
interim period.  They do not". (p. 209).   
The proposition that the negative drift is attributable to the failed bidders is not supported 
by the data in this study.  Firstly, while the average time to completion (in the successful bids) 
was approximately 31 days (standard deviation of 29 days), the largest negative post-
announcement abnormal return was observed during t+5.  It is not yet known why such large 
abnormal returns were encountered during this time period.  A further problem with the 
information release hypothesis, is that while bidding companies in failed takeover bids performed 
marginally worse than successful bidders, the negative abnormal returns over the post-bid 
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period observed in this study are not restricted to bidders in failed acquisition attempts or to any 
other clearly identifiable group of bidders.  All groups of bidders, on average, appears to have 
made abnormal losses during this time period. 
The negative post-announcement abnormal returns to bidders may also have been due 
to the bidding companies overpaying for their targets, but the market being slow to realise this 
overpayment.  This would be consistent with the "hubris" hypothesis suggested by Roll (1986).  
"One possibility is that acquiring firms on average pay too much for their target firms, but the 
market only realizes this slowly; the market is inefficient" (Fama (1991), p. 1602).  However, 
Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) did not find support for the hypothesis that the post-
announcement drift was caused by the market being slow to adjust the share price following the 
merger announcement. 
A third possible explanation for the post-announcement drift is that it is caused by model 
misspecification.  Both the market model and the index model assume β to remain constant over 
time.  The models do therefore not allow for any changes in risk.  If the level of systematic risk of 
the bidder changes over the time period of the bid, this may render the models inappropriate.  
Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) investigated this point, and argued that "...our results indicate 
that prior findings of negative postmerger share-price performance for bidders are more likely 
due to benchmark errors than to mispricing at the time of the announcement". (p. 95). 
Some researchers have, however, gathered evidence rejecting the theory that post-
announcement drift is caused by inadequate measurement of risk changes.  Agrawal, Jaffe and 
Mandelker (1992) analysed the post-merger performance of US acquiring firms (1955-1987), 
and "...conclude that Franks, Harris and Titman's results are specific to their sample period". (p. 
1614).  Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker found that "...neither the firm size effect nor beta 
estimation problems are the cause of the negative post-merger returns". (p. 1605).  In their study 
of earnings announcements, Ball, Kothari and Watts (1993) argued that "The results suggest 
that post-announcement drift persists after controlling for risk changes, but it is weaker than 
reported previously [when risk was assumed to be constant]". (p. 632).  Similarly, Bernard and 
Thomas (1989), "...concluded that much of our evidence cannot plausibly be reconciled with 
arguments built on risk mismeasurement but is consistent with a delayed price response". (p. 
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34).  Thus, the explanation of the post-announcement drift still eludes us. 
In the current study, statistically significant negative abnormal returns were observed for 
the post announcement period with both the market model and the index model.  Insufficient 
post-announcement return data was available to test for a significant change in the level of 
systematic risk of the overseas bidders.  It is therefore not known whether the negative post-
announcement abnormal returns are attributable to information release, market inefficiency or 
model misspecification.  This is an area which would benefit from further research. 
 
4.2. National Variations 
As indicated in table 1, a total of 14 different nationalities were represented in the sample 
of 71 overseas bidding companies analysed in this study.  Consequently, there was insufficient 
data available in order to test the significance of the different levels of abnormal returns to 
bidding companies from each of the countries represented. 
As indicated in the literature review, while the available evidence is mixed, there is some 
support for the notion that bidding companies based in the US do at least not perform worse 
than bidding companies based in the UK.  With regard to cross-border acquisitions, Conn and 
Connell (1990) found that while US companies acquiring UK companies lost from these 
transactions, UK companies acquiring in the US encountered even larger negative abnormal 
returns. 
It may be the case that, when acquiring abroad, the performance of the bidding company 
is dependent upon their previous takeover experience, and in particular the experience in cross-
border acquisitions.  It may further be hypothesised that companies from economies with large 
scale domestic and cross-border takeover markets are more likely to have such experience than 
are companies based in economies where the takeover market is less vigorous.  (As mentioned 
previously, insufficient information was available to ascertain the actual degree of takeover 
experience of the overseas companies). 
As the level of takeover activity in general, and in particular the number of cross-border 
transactions is commonly lower in Continental Europe than it is in the UK or the US, then one 
would expect the abnormal returns to companies based in Europe (excluding the UK) to be 
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inferior to the performance of American bidders if the above hypotheses are true. 
In order to test these hypotheses, the sample was split into European versus American 
bidders.  America includes the US and Canada; both countries where both domestic and cross-
border takeovers are prevalent (see e.g., OECD (1984) and Gray and McDermott (1988)).  As 
can be seen from the results in table 6, over the total analysis period from t-8 to t+5, American 
bidders performed (with the index model significantly) better than European bidders.  While the 
cumulative abnormal returns are negative for both groups of companies, they are significantly 
below zero only for European bidders.  The findings for takeover bids for UK listed companies 
are thus consistent with the hypothesis that bidding companies from markets with large numbers 
of cross-border takeovers perform better than other cross-border bidders, although there may 
possibly be other explanations for the difference in performance of American and European 
bidders. 
================ 
Insert Table 6 here 
================ 
 
4.3. Cross-Sectional Analysis 
Cross-sectional analysis was undertaken in order to establish the significance of various 
bid characteristics on the share price performance of the overseas bidding companies.  The 
analysis was based on the cumulative abnormal returns for the pre-bid period (t-8, t-2), the bid 
period (t-1, t=0), the post-bid period (t+1, t+5), as well as the total analysis period (t-8, t+5). 
The explanatory powers of the regressions varies depending on which time period is 
being analysed.  However, the adjusted R2 values are generally fairly high.  As indicated in table 
7, for the pre-bid period, up to 12.6% of the cross-sectional variability can be explained 
(significant only at the 11% level). 
As reported in table 8, the maximum R2 for the bid period was a more modest 7.1%, 
although significant at the 10% level.   Corresponding figures for the post-bid period were 8.2% 
(significant only at the 12% level) (not reported), and for the total analysis period (table 9) a 
highly respectable 16.7% (significant at the 2% level).  These values compares well to most 
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previous studies of abnormal returns to bidders in cross-border acquisitions.  For example, 
although highly statistically significant, the analysis by Doukas and Travlos (1988) explained only 
3.5% of the cross-sectional variability in cumulative abnormal returns for the whole sample, and 
a maximum of 8.13% for a subsample of bidders.  Mathur, Rangan, Chhachhi and Sundaram 
(1994) obtained a highly significant R2 of 11.77%.  Markides and Ittner (1994) obtained a R2 of 
16.5% for the full sample, and a very impressive 42.3% for a small subsample. 
The following sections discusses the importance of the seven different explanatory 
variables included in the cross-sectional regressions in this study. 
 
Successful versus Failed Bids 
Of the 71 takeover bids analysed using the index model, 12 (17%) failed.  The 
corresponding figures for MM were 10 failed bids from 50, giving a failure rate of 20%. 
As one would expect, there was no significant difference in the performance of 
successful and unsuccessful bidders during the period preceding the bid.  During the bid 
announcement period, the abnormal returns were again very similar, indicating that the market 
had, on average, not anticipated the eventual failure of the bid by the end of the bid 
announcement month.   
As observed in previous studies, unsuccessful bidders performed worse than successful 
bidders over the period following the bid announcement.  The difference in CAR was generally 
not, however, statistically significant. 
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Competitive versus Uncompetitive Bids 
A total of 14 (20%) of the index model, and 13 (26%) of the market model bids were 
competitive.  Overseas companies who's subsequent cross-border bids turned out to be 
competitive, performed significantly worse than the other bidding companies over the period 
prior to the bid.   One possible explanation for this finding, is that it was caused by the 
forthcoming bid.  This could be the case if the market was not only able to predict the 
forthcoming bid, but also that the bid would be competitive.  A more plausible explanation, 
however, is that weak companies, as reflected in a poor pre-bid share performance, are more 
likely to attract rival bidders than are well performing bidders.  Thus, the poor pre-bid 
performance may explain why the bid was competitive rather than vice versa. 
No significant differences in abnormal returns between single and competitive bidders 
was observed during the bid period.  Over the period following the bid announcement, 
competitive bidders performed significantly worse than the bidders engaged in uncompetitive 
bids (significant at the 10% level for both test models).  For the total analysis period from t-8 to 
t+5, bidders in competitive bids encountered significantly larger negative cumulative abnormal 
returns than did the successful bidders. 
 
Revised versus Unrevised Bids 
None of the regressions produces significant coefficients for the effect of the bid being 
revised.  This may be due to the small number of observations; only 8 (11%) of the bids 
analysed using the IM and 7 (14%) of the MM bids were revised.  The results indicates that 
revised bids do not result in an additional over-payment by the overseas bidder.  Indeed, rather 
surprisingly, the regressions indicate that bidders who increased the offer priced performed, on 
average, marginally better than other overseas bidding companies.  The coefficients for 
"Revised" were, however, never statistically significant. 
 
Cash versus Equity Offers 
The analysis of the impact of the method of payment proved to be inconclusive due to the 
small number of transactions where the bidder did not offer a full cash alternative.  As most 
investors are reluctant to accept payment in shares only listed abroad, the vast majority of 
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acquisitions tend to be cash financed.  Indeed, only 3 (4%) of the IM and 2 (4%) of the MM bids 
did not offer cash.  Thus, although the coefficients for "Equity" have the expected positive sign, 
they are not statistically significant.  Similar inconclusive results were reached by Markides and 
Ittner (1994) who in their study of US cross-border bidders, found that "...contrary to the 
evidence from domestic acquisitions, the form of payment ... is consistently insignificant". (p. 
360). 
 
Size Effects 
Two different size effects were analysed; firstly, the market capitalisation of the target 
company in relation to the market value of the bidding company, and secondly, the natural log of 
the market capitalisation of the bidding company.  It is interesting to note that the relative size 
variable is never statistically significant when analysed in isolation.  However, when the two 
different size effects are analysed together, both the variables are generally highly significant. 
Over the pre-bid period, overseas companies who subsequently went on to bid for large 
UK listed companies, performed significantly better (at the 5% or 10% level, depending on model 
specification) than the companies bidding for smaller targets.  These results are consistent with 
the hypothesis that the stock markets were able to predict the forthcoming takeover bids, and 
although investors on average reacted negatively to the cross-border takeover bids, they 
responded less severely against companies acquiring large UK companies.  Further research 
would be required in order to test this hypothesis.  More significantly (at least with the index 
model), large companies outperformed smaller bidders over the period prior to the bid 
announcement. 
Over the bid announcement period, the relative size of the bid had some impact on the 
cumulative abnormal returns of the bidders.  The variable was significant at the 5% level with the 
MM, but not significant with the IM.  Large bidders, irrespective of the bid size, also performed 
marginally better than smaller bidders over the bid period, although not statistically significant. 
Over the period following the bid, the relative size of the target and bidding companies 
did not help to explain the cross-sectional variation in the level of CAR for the overseas bidding 
companies.  However, large bidding companies continued to outperform the smaller bidders 
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after the takeover, with the "Size" variable being significant at the 10% level with both models 
(not reported in tables). 
Looking at the total analysis period from t-8 to t+5 (table 9), it is clear that both of the 
size-related variables are highly significant explanatory variables of the variation in the level of 
cumulative abnormal returns to the overseas companies bidding for UK listed companies during 
the 1986-1991 period.  Larger bidders performed significantly better than smaller companies.  In 
addition, although the general reaction of the stock market to a cross-border takeover bid was 
negative (as indicated by the highly significant negative CARs), the market reacted less 
negatively if the overseas company targeted a large UK company than when they acquired a 
small firm. 
======================= 
Insert Tables 7, 8, and 9 here 
======================= 
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper analyses the abnormal returns to 71 overseas companies, which made 
takeover bids for listed UK companies during the 1986-1991 period.  The analysis revealed 
small, but statistically insignificant, positive average abnormal returns of 0.80% with the index 
model (IM) and 0.23% with the market model (MM) during the month of the bid announcement.  
These results are not materially different from those of Feils (1993), who established that US 
bidders lost insignificantly over an 11 day period surrounding the announcement of an 
acquisition into the UK during the 1980-1990 period. 
However, this study also reveals that the overseas bidding companies, on average, 
encountered negative abnormal returns in each of the five months following the bid 
announcement.  The post-announcement cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) amounted to a 
highly significant -4.77% for the IM and -9.79% for the MM, and the CAR for the total analysis 
period, stretching from eight months prior to, to five months after the month of the bid 
announcement, amounted to -5.34% with the index model, and -16.46% with the market model, 
both values statistically significant. 
 27
These results are thus fairly consistent with those obtained by Conn and Connell (1990), 
who established that US companies acquiring in the UK on average lost approximately 2.5% 
over the six months following the bid announcement.  However, the magnitude of the negative 
CARs reported in this study are somewhat higher than those observed by Conn and Connell. 
These results highlight the importance of the length of the event window, and helps 
explain why the existing literature on both domestic and cross-border acquisitions tend to 
produce more favourable results for the bidding companies when analysing abnormal returns 
over a short time period than is the case with studies analysing medium to long-term effects of 
mergers and acquisitions.  It is not yet known why the overseas bidding companies, on average, 
encountered negative abnormal returns over the eight month period prior to the bid 
announcement.  In addition, the continued large abnormal losses over the months following the 
bid announcement also remain a puzzle.  These are areas which would benefit from further 
research. 
It was hypothesised that bidding companies from active takeover markets would have 
more takeover experience and as a result perform better than other bidders engaged in cross-
border acquisitions.  Analysis revealed that American bidders performed better than bidders 
based in Continental Europe, thus lending some support to this hypothesis.  These results help 
explain at least part of the difference in the magnitude of the abnormal losses observed by Conn 
and Connell (1990) for US companies acquiring in the UK, and the results reported in this study, 
involving bidders from a total of 14 different countries.  While both Fatemi and Furtdao (1988) 
and Doukas and Travlos (1988) controlled for whether or not the bidding companies already had 
overseas operations, an interesting area for future research would be to establish whether 
previous takeover (and in particular cross-border) experience has a significant impact on the 
performance of the bidder around the period of the announcement of a cross-border acquisition. 
Cross-sectional analysis revealed that the overseas bidding companies performed better 
in successful than in failed bids, and in single bidder rather than competitive bids.  The size of 
the target relative to the bidder, as well as the absolute size of the bidder were also found to 
have significant positive impact on the abnormal returns to the bidding company.  Whether or not 
the bid was revised, or financed by either cash or equity, was not found to have a significant 
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impact on the bidding company's fortunes.  This may, at least in part have been due to the small 
number of bids being revised or not involving cash. 
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 Figure 1 
 
 Total Value of Mergers and Acquisitions in the United Kingdom - 
 Domestic and Cross-Border 
 
Expenditure on initial payments for acquisitions and mergers by industrial and commercial companies within the UK compared 
to value of cross-border acquisitions and mergers in the UK by overseas companies.  The values include payment in complete 
acquisitions for both private and public UK companies.  The values have not been adjusted for inflation. 
Source: Cooke (1988), and Business Briefing (1991a-1994b). 
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 Figure 2 
 
 Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 to Cross-Border Bidding Companies 
 
Average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) to overseas companies making takeover bids for UK listed companies (1986-
1991).  For information on model specifications, see table 4. 
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 Table 1 
 
 Takeover Bids for Listed UK Companies (1986-1991); 
 By Nationality of the Cross-Border Bidding Companies 
 
Of the 208 cross-border takeover bids, 34 were not suitable for analysis (see note 6), leaving a total of 174 for which analysis 
was attempted.  Lack of data reduced the sample further to a total of 71 takeover bids for the index model (IM) and 50 for the 
market model (MM).  
 
 
 
Total number 
of bids 
 
Bids for 
analysis 
 
Sample 
IM 
 
Sample 
MM 
 
Austria 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0  
 
0 
 
Australia 
 
14 
 
12 
 
4  
 
1 
 
Belgium 
 
2 
 
1 
 
0  
 
0 
 
Bermuda 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0  
 
0 
 
British Virgin Islands 
 
2 
 
2 
 
0  
 
0 
 
Canada 
 
5 
 
5 
 
4  
 
4 
 
Cayman Islands 
 
2 
 
2 
 
0  
 
0 
 
Denmark 
 
3 
 
2 
 
1  
 
1 
 
Eire 
 
8 
 
7 
 
6  
 
4 
 
Finland 
 
3 
 
3 
 
0  
 
0 
 
France 
 
38 
 
24 
 
10  
 
6 
 
Germany 
 
9 
 
9 
 
5  
 
4 
 
Hong Kong 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0  
 
0 
 
Italy 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1  
 
0 
 
Japan 
 
6 
 
6 
 
5  
 
1 
 
Liechtenstein 
 
3 
 
3 
 
0  
 
0 
 
Luxembourg 
 
4 
 
2 
 
0  
 
0 
 
Malaysia 
 
2 
 
1 
 
0  
 
0 
 
Netherlands 
 
8 
 
7 
 
4  
 
4 
 
Norway 
 
3 
 
2 
 
1  
 
1 
 
New Zealand 
 
13 
 
12 
 
3  
 
0 
 
Panama 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0  
 
0 
 
South Africa 
 
4 
 
1 
 
0  
 
0 
 
Saudi Arabia 
 
2 
 
1 
 
0  
 
0 
 
Sweden 
 
14 
 
14 
 
3  
 
3 
 
Switzerland 
 
15 
 
15 
 
7  
 
5 
 
USA 
 
43 
 
38 
 
17  
 
16 
     
 36
TOTAL 208 174 71  50 
 
 
 Table 2 
 
 Market Values of Cross-Border Bidding Companies 
 
Market values of cross-border bidding companies were measured as the capitalised value of the ordinary shares outstanding 9 
months prior to the date of the takeover bid for the UK listed target company.  Market values were converted into Sterling 
using exchange rate at day of measurement. 
Source: Datastream. 
 
 
Market Value (£ millions) 
 
 Number of Bids 
 
0-99  
 
8  
 
100-199  
 
6  
 
200-399  
 
10  
 
400-599  
 
5  
 
600-799 
 
5  
 
800-999 
 
2  
 
1000-4999 
 
23  
 
5000-9999 
 
7  
 
10000-14999 
 
4  
 
15000-19999 
 
1  
 
Total number of observations 
 
71 
 
Mean market value (millions) 
 
£2,374.6 
 
Standard deviation of mean market value (millions) 
 
£3,544.0 
 
 Table 3 
 
 Sign of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns to Cross-Border Bidding Companies 
 
Time periods refer to months relative to the month of tbe bid announcement, which is denoted t=0.  The distribution of the cumulative abnormal returns have been tested using the Sign test, 
corrected for continuity (see Siegel and Castellan (1988), pp. 80-87).  The test is specified as follows: 
 
  
z = (2x ±1 - N) / √N 
 
where x is the number of positive abnormal returns and N the total number of observations.  We use +1 when x < N/2 and -1 when x > N/2.  z is distributed approximately normally with zero mean 
and unit variance. 
 
For none of the time periods, with either of the models, were the proportion of positive cumulative abnormal returns significantly different from 0.5.  
 
 
 
 
Pre-Bid Period 
(t-8, t-2) 
 
Bid Period 
(t-1, t=0)  
 
Post-Bid Period 
(t+1, t+5) 
 
Total Analysis Period 
(t-8, t+5) 
 
 
 
Positive 
 
Negative 
 
Positive 
 
Negative 
 
Positive 
 
Negative 
 
Positive 
 
Negative 
 
  IM 
 
40.8% 
 
59.2% 
 
50.7% 
 
49.3% 
 
50.7% 
 
49.3% 
 
40.8% 
 
59.2% 
 
  MM 
 
44.0% 
 
56.0% 
 
44.0% 
 
56.0% 
 
40.0% 
 
60.0% 
 
40.0% 
 
60.0% 
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 Table 4 
 
 Percent Loge Average Abnormal Returns 
 to Cross-Border Bidding Companies 
 
Average abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) to overseas companies making takeover bids for UK 
listed companies (1986-1991).  The AR/CAR has been estimated using the market model (MM) and the index model (IM), 
specified as follows: 
 
MM:  logeRi = αi + βilogeRm + µi
IM:  logeRi = logeRm + µi
 
where loge is the natural log, Ri is the return on the share, Rm the return on the market, αi and βi regression coefficients, and µi 
the estimated abnormal return during time period i.  Time periods refer to months relative to the month of the bid 
announcement, which is denoted t=0. 
 
 
Period 
 
 Index Model 
 
 Market Model 
 
t-8 
 
-1.10 
 
-0.54 
 
t-7 
 
 0.63 
 
-0.68 
 
t-6 
 
 1.63**
 
 0.65 
 
t-5 
 
-0.15 
 
-0.81 
 
t-4 
 
-0.71 
 
-2.36*
 
t-3 
 
-0.20 
 
-0.24 
 
t-2 
 
-1.11 
 
-1.67 
 
t-1 
 
-0.36 
 
-1.26 
 
t=0 
 
 0.80 
 
 0.23 
 
t+1 
 
-0.32 
 
-1.62 
 
t+2 
 
-0.74 
 
-1.22 
 
t+3 
 
-0.42 
 
-0.28 
 
t+4 
 
-0.84 
 
-1.53 
 
t+5 
 
-2.45**
 
-5.14***
 
 
 Percent Loge Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
Pre-bid period   (t-8, t-2) 
 
-1.00 
 
-5.63*
 
Bid period    (t-1, t=0) 
 
0.44 
 
-1.03 
 
Post-bid period  (t+1, t+5) 
 
-4.77**
 
-9.79***
 
Total analysis period (t-8, t+5) 
 
-5.34*
 
-16.46***
 
*, **, and *** indicates that the null hypothesis of abnormal return/cumulative abnormal return equal to zero has been rejected 
at the 10, 5 or 1 percent level of significance respectively.  Following Strong (1992) and Kumar, Sen and Shome (1992), the 
Patell Standardised Residual (PSR) Test (Patell (1976)) has been applied for the MM. The simple t-test (Strong (1992), pp. 
544-545) has been applied for the IM. 
  
 Table 5 
 
 Comparative Analysis of Average Market Model Parameters 
 
 
 
 
Alpha 
 
Beta 
 
Present study - Overseas bidders 
 
0.009 
 
0.788 
 
Franks and Harris (1989) - UK bidders 
 
0.010 
 
0.92 
 
Limmack (1991) - UK bidders 
 
0.006 
 
0.86 
 
Connell and Conn (1993) - UK bidders 
 
0.003 
 
1.061 
 
Connell and Conn (1993) - US bidders 
 
0.001 
 
0.806 
 
  
 Table 6 
 
 Percent Loge Cumulative Abnormal Returns over Analysis Period 
 (t-8, t+5) to American versus European (Non-UK) Bidders 
 
"American bidders" includes bidding companies based in US and Canada, while "European (non-UK) bidders" comprises 
bidding companies based in Denmark, Eire, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.  A full 
breakdown of the nationality of the cross-border bidders is provided in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
Index Model 
 
Market Model 
 
American bidders 
 
-4.88% 
(-0.99) 
 
-5.13% 
(-0.99) 
 
European (non-UK) bidders 
 
-9.82%*
(-1.87) 
 
-26.81%***
(-2.90) 
 
t-test for difference of 
means 
 
0.69 
 
2.04**
 
t-statistics in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicates value statistically significant at the 10, 5 or 1 percent level of significance 
respectively. 
 
 
 Table 7 
 
 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Pre-Bid Period (t-8, t-2) Percent Loge Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
The following table contains regression output from analysis of the influence of various bid characteristics on the average CAR to overseas bidding companies.  Various specifications were 
applied, such as (number 5) involving all the explanatory variables, specified as follows: 
 
CARi = Constant + β1 Outcome + β2 Competitive + β3 Revised + β4 Pay + β5 Rel Size + β6 Size + εi. 
 
Outcome is a dummy variable taking the value of 0 if the bid was successful (in that the bidding company obtained control over the target company) and 1 if the offer failed, Competitive is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 0 if there was a single bidder and the value 1 if more than one company bid for the target (competitive bid), Revised is a dummy variable taking the value 0 if 
the offer was not revised and the value 1 if the terms of the offer were revised (price offered increased), Pay is a dummy variable taking the value of 0 if there was not a full cash alternative and the 
value 1 if the offer included a full cash alternative, Rel Size measures the pre-bid market value of the target divided by the pre-bid market value of the bidder, Size is the natural log of the pre-bid 
market value of the bidding company, and ε is an error term. 
 
 
 
 
Index Model 
 
Market Model 
 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
Constant 
 
-0.006 
(-0.25) 
 
-0.014 
(-0.14) 
 
-0.013 
(-0.14) 
 
-0.292***
(-2.79) 
 
-0.384**
(-2.18) 
 
-0.048 
(-1.31) 
 
-0.093 
(-0.58) 
 
-0.089 
(-0.59) 
 
-0.365**
(-2.33) 
 
-0.476**
(-2.03) 
 
Outcome 
 
0.021 
(0.37) 
 
0.002 
(0.04) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.013 
(0.19) 
 
0.084 
(1.00) 
 
0.007 
(0.09) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.005 
(0.05) 
 
Competitive 
 
-0.052 
(-0.89) 
 
 
 
-0.039 
(-0.79) 
 
 
 
-0.138**
(-2.05) 
 
-0.171**
(-2.04) 
 
 
 
-0.099 
(-1.43) 
 
 
 
-0.219**
(-2.09) 
 
Revised 
 
0.021 
(0.30) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.074 
(1.01) 
 
0.137 
(1.40) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.172 
(1.57) 
 
Pay 
 
 
 
0.004 
(0.03) 
 
0.011 
(0.11) 
 
 
 
0.107 
(0.62) 
 
 
 
0.037 
(0.23) 
 
0.061 
(0.39) 
 
 
 
0.182 
(0.79) 
 
Rel Size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0007**
(2.01) 
 
0.0008*
(1.98) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0010*
(2.01) 
 
0.0011*
(2.00) 
 
Size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.041***
(2.72) 
 
0.041**
(2.65) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.043*
(1.96) 
 
0.037 
(1.66) 
 
Obs 
 
71 
 
71 
 
71 
 
55 
 
55 
 
50 
 
50 
 
50 
 
39 
 
39 
 
Adj R2
 
0.0% 
 
0.0% 
 
0.0% 
 
9.3% 
 
10.9% 
 
2.8% 
 
0.0% 
 
0.2% 
 
6.7% 
 
12.6% 
 
F value 
(p-value) 
 
0.26 
(0.851) 
 
0.00 
(0.999) 
 
0.31 
(0.734) 
 
3.76 
(0.030) 
 
2.10*
(0.070) 
 
1.46 
(0.237) 
 
0.03 
(0.973) 
 
1.05 
(0.358) 
 
2.36 
(0.109) 
 
1.91 
(0.109) 
t-statistics in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicates value statistically significant at the 10, 5 or 1 percent level of significance respectively. 
 
 
 
 Table 8 
 
 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Bid Period (t-1, t=0) Percent Loge Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
Variables as defined in table 7. 
 
 
 
 
Index Model 
 
Market Model 
 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
Constant 
 
-0.009 
(-0.64) 
 
-0.071 
(-1.29) 
 
-0.055 
(-1.01) 
 
-0.050 
(-0.78) 
 
-0.196*
(-1.82) 
 
-0.020 
(-1.14) 
 
-0.065 
(-0.90) 
 
-0.046 
(-0.64) 
 
-0.137*
(-1.94) 
 
-0.262**
(-2.35) 
 
Outcome 
 
0.035 
(1.08) 
 
0.049 
(1.63) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.035 
(0.84) 
 
0.048 
(1.21) 
 
0.039 
(1.09) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.037 
(0.70) 
 
Competitive 
 
0.029 
(0.86) 
 
 
 
0.041 
(1.44) 
 
 
 
0.033 
(0.80) 
 
-0.025 
(-0.64) 
 
 
 
0.005 
(0.15) 
 
 
 
-0.025 
(-0.50) 
 
Revised 
 
0.012 
(0.30) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.004 
(0.08) 
 
-0.046 
(0.98) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.039 
(0.76) 
 
Pay 
 
 
 
0.070 
(1.26) 
 
0.054 
(0.95) 
 
 
 
0.165 
(1.57) 
 
 
 
0.049 
(0.67) 
 
0.035 
(0.48) 
 
 
 
0.153 
(1.40) 
 
Rel Size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0002 
(1.12) 
 
0.0004 
(1.57) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0005**
(2.12) 
 
0.0006**
(2.21) 
 
Size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.010 
(1.05) 
 
0.006 
(0.58) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.019*
(1.89) 
 
0.015 
(1.36) 
 
Obs 
 
71 
 
71 
 
71 
 
55 
 
55 
 
50 
 
50 
 
50 
 
39 
 
39 
 
Adj R2
 
0.7% 
 
2.6% 
 
1.8% 
 
0.0% 
 
1.2% 
 
0.0% 
 
0.0% 
 
0.0% 
 
7.1% 
 
4.5% 
 
F value 
(p-value) 
 
1.17 
(0.326) 
 
1.94 
(0.151) 
 
1.64 
(0.201) 
 
0.72 
(0.491) 
 
1.11 
(0.372) 
 
0.66 
(0.579) 
 
0.72 
(0.491) 
 
0.14 
(0.870) 
 
2.45 
(0.101) 
 
1.3 
(0.286) 
 
t-statistics in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicates value statistically significant at the 10, 5 or 1 percent level of significance respectively. 
 
 
 Table 9 
 
 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Total Analysis Period (t-8, t+5) Percent Loge Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
Variables as defined in table 7. 
 
 
 
 
Index Model 
 
Market Model 
 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
Constant 
 
-0.036 
(-0.89) 
 
-0.239 
(-1.43) 
 
-0.257 
(-1.58) 
 
-0.619***
(-3.50) 
 
-0.881***
(-2.98) 
 
-0.137*
(-1.96) 
 
-0.326 
(-1.06) 
 
-0.347 
(-1.20) 
 
-0.888***
(-2.94) 
 
-1.131**
(-2.51) 
 
Outcome 
 
-0.031 
(-0.32) 
 
-0.054 
(-0.60) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.036 
(-0.31) 
 
0.102 
(0.64) 
 
-0.043 
(-0.29) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.007 
(0.03) 
 
Competitive 
 
-0.086 
(-0.86) 
 
 
 
-0.096 
(-1.14) 
 
 
 
-0.208*
(-1.84) 
 
-0.339**
(-2.10) 
 
 
 
-0.221 
(-1.67) 
 
 
 
-0.421**
(-2.09) 
 
Revised 
 
0.041 
(0.34) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.099 
(0.81) 
 
0.290 
(1.54) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.337 
(1.59) 
 
Pay 
 
 
 
0.203 
(1.21) 
 
0.232 
(1.39) 
 
 
 
0.325 
(1.12) 
 
 
 
0.177 
(0.58) 
 
0.250 
(0.84) 
 
 
 
0.387 
(0.87) 
 
Rel Size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0011*
(1.80) 
 
0.0015**
(2.17) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0020**
(2.05) 
 
0.0023**
(2.08) 
 
Size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.083***
(3.28) 
 
0.079***
(3.06) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.102**
(2.38) 
 
0.089**
(2.05) 
 
Obs 
 
71 
 
71 
 
71 
 
55 
 
55 
 
50 
 
50 
 
50 
 
39 
 
39 
 
Adj R2
 
0.0% 
 
0.0% 
 
1.3% 
 
14.1% 
 
16.7% 
 
3.8% 
 
0.0% 
 
2.4% 
 
9.6% 
 
15.7% 
 
F value 
(p-value) 
 
0.41 
(0.745) 
 
0.99 
(0.378) 
 
1.47 
(0.238) 
 
5.44 
(0.007) 
 
2.81 
(0.020) 
 
1.65 
(0.191) 
 
0.24 
(0.789) 
 
1.60 
(0.213) 
 
3.01 
(0.062) 
 
2.18 
(0.072) 
 
t-statistics in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicates value statistically significant at the 10, 5 or 1 percent level of significance respectively. 
 
 
 
NOTES 
                                            
i. These models were (i) the market model, (ii) a model based on adjusted betas, and (iii) the index 
model. 
ii. Conn and Connell used various forms of the market model; they used both pre-, pooled-, and post-
event alphas and betas, as well as a Domestic and an International version of the market model.  
The 2.5% abnormal loss reported here was calculated using the domestic market model with alpha 
and beta parameters estimated over the period from 36 to 7 months prior to the bid announcement. 
iii. Biswas analysed the returns to 125 bidding companies from 12 countries and 81 target companies 
from 11 countries.  She did not, however, comment on whether there were any national variations, 
but rather treated all the cross-border bidding companies as a homogenous group (and likewise with 
the cross-border target companies). 
iv. For some companies the required market capitalisation information was not available from the LBS 
RMS.  In these circumstances, attempts were made to obtain the information from Datastream 
International.  Due to some of the target companies only being traded in the OTC market, for a few 
firms the market capitalisation was not available from either the LBS RMS or Datastream. 
v. Fatemi and Furtado (1988) also faced a problem of incomplete information.  While it was known that 
93 of the companies.  However, for the 24 companies deemed to have no overseas operations, the 
authors could confirm the lack of overseas subsidiaries for only 2.  Thus, for the remaining 22 
companies there was a lack of information, and these companies were simply assumed not to have 
overseas operations. 
vi. Firstly, five offers have been excluded from the analysis due to these being partial bids.  The 
Takeover Code (The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (1990)) stipulates that normally offers have 
to be made for all outstanding shares.  Special dispensation is required prior to the announcement of 
a partial takeover bid.  Such bids are therefore unusual.  Offers for British investment trusts (9 bids) 
have also been excluded.  Such companies are generally valued as a percentage of their net asset 
value, and the offer value fluctuates in line with the market value of the assets of the target 
company.  The last major category of bids excluded from the analysis, is offers for British water 
companies (13 bids).  As explained by The Department of Trade and Industry (1991), "There are 
special arrangements for water company mergers under the Water Act 1989.  A merger must be 
referred to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission if the water-related assets of the acquiring 
company and the acquired company are each more than £30m". (p. 5).  Two bids were rejected as 
they were joint bids between two foreign companies.  A further five bids were rejected for other 
reasons, mainly due to incomplete information from Acquisitions Monthly. 
vii. Thirteen of the foreign bidding companies attempted to acquire two or more listed UK companies 
during the period from 1986 to 1991  (the 174 cross-border takeover bids into the UK were made by 
a total of 156 different overseas entities).  When analysing the abnormal return to shareholders from 
a takeover bid for a "frequent bidder", there is a possible danger of the Market Model parameters 
and/or the abnormal return estimates being 'contaminated' by the effect of a previous takeover.  One 
way to overcome this potential problem, is to exclude from the analysis takeover bids by companies 
which made (or indeed, received) other takeover bids during the analysis period.  For two distinct 
reasons, such an approach has not been adopted here. 
Firstly, there is a possibility that companies which attempt a second merger are the ones 
which considered their first acquisition to be a financial success, while the ones who do not go on to 
make a second takeover bid are the ones who regret having made the first acquisition.  In his study 
of mergers and acquisitions in the German market, Bühner (1991) established that "Firms that have 
frequent experience of mergers tend to gain from their mergers" (p. 513), while infrequent bidders 
tended to experience large negative cumulative abnormal returns.  Thus, excluding frequent bidders 
from the analysis may lead to an exclusion of "successful" bidders, thus introducing a negative bias 
into the analysis. 
Secondly, there is a problem of data availability.  If frequent bidders were to be excluded 
from the analysis, it would be necessary to know of all takeover bids (not only for listed UK 
companies, but also for private UK companies as well as for listed and private foreign companies) 
made (or received) during the 74 month period from 68 months prior to the month of the takeover bid 
to 5 months after the bid.  It has, unfortunately, not been possible to obtain this information. 
viii. In this study, the return to bidders has been compared to the return on the stock market index (price 
change and average dividend yield) in their home countries.  Conn and Connell (1990) applied both 
a domestic market model (DMM) and an international market model (IMM).  They concluded, 
 
                                                                                                                       
however, that "...there is no compelling reason to incur the extra research costs associated with the 
more complex IMM". (p. 708).  Roll (1977) argued that the stock market index is misspecified as a 
proxy for the return on the market.  However, as argued by Schipper and Thompson (1983), 
"...whatever bias result from misspecification should be contained in the entire matrix of residuals, 
both in and out of the event periods.  Unusual residual behavior in the event periods, relative to the 
residuals in the non-event periods, is suggestive of something more than model misspecification". 
(p. 96).  
ix. MM has only been applied if at least 30 observations were available during the parameter estimation 
period. 
 
x. For example, Franks, Broyles and Hecht (1977) found that share prices of target companies started 
rising significantly 3 months prior to the announcement of the takeover bid.  Hannigan (1988) argued 
that "... take-overs provide prime insider dealing opportunities...", and used an Acquisitions Monthly 
survey (published March 1986) to support her argument: "Acquisitions Monthly ... found that of 1200 
mergers studied, the price of the target rose by 54% during the 6 months before the bid, 39% during 
the month before and 25% on the day before". (p. 18).  While the Acquisitions Monthly survey 
referred to target rather than bidding companies, it is plausible that if investors can predict who will 
become takeover targets up to six month prior to the bid announcement, they may also be able to 
identify the bidding companies. 
xi. Companies have only been included in the analysis if return data was available for the whole 
analysis period from 8 months prior to the month of the bid announcement, to 5 months after the 
month in which the takeover offer was made. 
xii. Sea Containers, a Bermuda based company, has been included in the analysis, but has been 
classified as USA based, as that is where the company has its shares listed. 
xiii. Franks and Harris found a large difference in the (post-announcement) cumulative abnormal returns 
dependent on the control model applied.  The CAR (or TAR in their terminology) over the 24 months 
following the bid announcement was positive (and significant) using the index model and CAPM, and 
significantly negative when applying the market model (p. 245). 
xiv. Fowler, Rorke and Jog evaluated (i) the Scholes and Williams technique (1977), (ii) the Scholes and 
Williams Extended (as developed by Fowler and Rorke (1979) (described in Fowler, Rorke and Jog 
1980), (iii) the Scholes and Williams with Jafnike, and lastly (iv) the Dimson technique (1979). 
xv. The analysis was also performed using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).  The results (not 
reported here) lies somewhere between those for the Market Model and the Index Model. 
 
